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India’s new and contested status as a nuclear power2, the scale of her arms 
purchases,3 her investment in missile technology4 and the huge deployment of 
ground troops on the western front against Pakistan are issues of immediate 
concern to her South Asian neighbours. Since tension feeds on tension, war in 
Afghanistan, terrorist attacks in Kolkata, Delhi, Jammu and Srinagar, mounting 
tension between India and Pakistan over the issue of cross-border terrorism in 
Kashmir and the recent threat by General Pervez Musharraf to consider the first 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2002 RAAF Aerospace Conference, 
Canberra, May 27-29, 2002. I would like to thank Malte Pehl for his research assistance, 
particularly with the organigram. 
1 Subrata Kumar Mitra (PhD, Rochester) is Professor and Head of the Department of 
Political Science of the South Asia Institute, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg and 
Visiting Fellow, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, Email: 
js3@ix.urz.uni-heidelberg.de. 
2 Neither the five recognized nuclear weapon states, nor the signatory states of the NPT and 
CTBT and the members of the IAEA formally recognize India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear 
status. However, at the informal level, the major actors, above all the US administration, 
follow a rather pragmatic policy by engaging India in tacit negotiations and increasingly 
intense cooperation on nuclear safety and restrictions on technology transfer. 
3 India, as Cohen reports, (2001, p. 31), “has been in the midst of a major arms buying 
spree. A recent purchase from Russia for more than $4 billion worth of equipment will 
argument India’s tank force and air fleet considerably and permit the acquisition of several 
important ships, including a second aircraft carrier. This included a $3 billion agreement to 
produce aircraft under license and acquire modern tanks and an aircraft carrier.” See “India, 
Russia Sign $3 Billion arms deal,” Times of India, December 29, 2000. Also “India, Russia 
Ready Military Arms Dealer,” CNN.com, October 4, 2000. India has just purchased more 
than a thousand man-portable radar systems from Israel and is negotiating a deal on Hawk 
jets with the UK. 
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strike option as part of Pakistan’s strategic response to Indian mobilisation have 
contributed to the seriousness of the situation. The probability of the regional 
conflict escalating into large scale nuclear war, or weapons of mass destruction 
finding their way into the hands of non-state actors, have drawn world attention to 
South Asia, which has had visits in quick succession by political leaders and 
military delegations from the United States, UK, Germany, France, China and 
Russia. 
The paper, focused on India’s capacities, perceptions and institutional 
arrangements for the management of security, seeks to evaluate the significance of 
her status as an ‘emerging’ power for the security environment in Asia, and its 
implication for the international system. It analyses the main objective both 
empirically, and theoretically. The empirical aspect concerns the measurement of 
India’s economic and military resources according to the conventional indicators of 
power.5 These facts, based on experts’ accounts, are supplemented by political and 
institutional factors which are significant for the estimation of the power of a 
country. 
 In addition, the analysis seeks to juxtapose the views of observers and actors, 
and locate the strategic perception of the Indian voter, an important factor in her 
political landscape in view of her active democratic process. These factors of 
contemporary politics are to be seen in the larger context of India’s political and 
security culture, history, the structure of the political system. The issue of 
contextualisation needs to be understood in terms of its methodological implication 
at the outset, because, while all states are members of the international system, the 
use to which they put international politics varies from one context to another. 
Western nation states, products of a long process of nation building, 
industrialisation and state-formation, seek the promotion of national interest 
through their strategic initiatives. Post-colonial state-nations, engaged in the 
process of nation-creation, are more complex in their rhetoric. For these actors, 
international politics, in addition to being used as an instrument of national interest, 
also plays a symbolic role in the building of a national profile. The paper seeks to 
combine both the material and symbolic aspects of Indian policy in the concept of a 
security doctrine, one that can bring potential power into an effective focus, in the 
absence of which mere appurtenances of power like guns and ships are just that and 
                                                 
4 “India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) comprises four 
missile systems: Prithvi, surface-to-surface tactical battlefield missile; Akash, medium-
range surface-to-air missile; Trishul, short-range surface-to-air missile; and Nag, third-
generation anti-tank missile. Trishul is getting ready for user trials. Akash and Nag are in 
advanced stages of development. This programme includes a development of the 
intermediate- range ballistic missile, Agni. The Department has developed and preserved 
convenience foods for the armed forces. It is vigorously pursuing the goal of technological 
self-reliance in defence systems through a 10-year national self-reliance mission. State-of-
the-art technologies developed for missile programme, LCA and other high technology 
systems are being canalised to make available bio-medical equipment at a much less cost.” 
(Singh, 1999, p. 140). 
5 For the purpose, the paper draws on India: Book of the Year 2002 for primary data and a 
broad range of expert accounts including those by Cohen (2001), Tellis (2001) and 
Perkovich (1999). 
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not much more. Since the stability of the doctrine, in addition to its coherence is an 
important parameter of the significance of Indian power, the paper also takes into 
account the problems of implementation as well.6 
Though there is considerable force to the argument that South Asian security is 
crucially contingent on the India-China-Pakistan triangle,7 India remains the 
biggest power in South Asia, and her significance, in terms of how India sees 
herself and how others see her, is a key consideration for regional politics. The 
need for a sophisticated methodological analysis arises paradoxically from the fact 
that India is a democratic state and an open society, both of which give a false 
sense of visibility to India’s security profile.8 Foreign observers, depending on their 
own national origin and the context, place their bets on predictions of India’s next 
move either as the ‘regional bully’ or the ‘regional push-over’, and India, Janus-
like, often proves both speculations to be right, appearing in the process to be either 
mystical-moral, or utterly devoid of principle or doctrine.9  
 The paper is in three parts. The first examines the state of play by ranking India 
with reference to her strategic resource endowments. The second part examines 
India’s strategic doctrine and the organigram of security, and evaluates her 
potential power in the light of her doctrine. The third part makes a prognosis of the 
challenging path ahead for India with reference to the unsolved problems 
concerning her national security. The conclusion reconsiders the main issue posed 
in the introduction in the light of the analysis undertaken here. 
 
I N D I A  A S  A N  E M E R G I N G  P O W E R  
 
One of the main difficulties of approaching the theme of India’s position as an 
emerging major power is that it is difficult to measure India’s power with any 
degree of precision. Methods of ranking such as the one based on economic 
resources and military hardware, the reputational method and a ‘class analysis’ 
which measures a state’s net power in relation to putative adversaries10 come up 
with conflicting results. The net outcome is a sense of fluidity with regard to 
India’s rank as a power and the conclusion that India belongs to the class of 
countries that are always emerging but never quite arriving. 
                                                 
6 As such, the paper seeks to balance the neo-realist approach, and the constructivist 
approach (Wendt, 1999), which connects the world of bombs and guns with the web of 
meanings specific to the stakeholders. The key texts used for this purpose in this paper 
include Jaswant Singh, Defending India (Macmillan: 1999), Official Statements of the 
Government of India in Context of Terrorism and Related Issues (Ministry of External 
Affairs, GOI: 2002) and the recently declassified Reforming the National Security System: 
Recommendation of the Group of Ministers (GOI: 2001). 
7 See Mitra (2001), Racine (2001). 
8 Notwithstanding Indian openness and garrulity, the preparations for the nuclear tests in 
Pokhran were kept secret up to the very last moment, a fact that is considered to be a major 
intelligence failure on the part of the American NSA. 
9 Notice, for example, the tremendous costs in terms of lives and prestige paid for an Indian 
stand on Sri Lanka and the utter silence of the Indian regime on the most important 
settlement just concluded between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. 
10 See Cohen (2001), pp. 25-31. 
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The data on the conventional criteria of power such as population, economy, 
military personnel and hardware, are generally accessible. In terms of gross 
indicators of size of the population and the economy, India is among the leading 
states in the world. As regards the number of inhabitants, India has the world’s 
second largest population, having just passed the billion mark, and on current 
trends, could surpass China in the next few decades. India is far ahead of the 
United States (270 million), and other points of reference like Russia, Indonesia, 
Japan, Pakistan, Brazil, and Nigeria all of which are home to between 100 million 
and 250 million people. According to the World Bank’s World Development 
Report 1999/2000, India’s economy is gigantic in terms of overall gross national 
product (GNP). It ranks eleventh in the world, with a total figure of US$421 
billion, compared with China’s US$929 billion, and Japan’s US$4,090 billion. 
When measured by purchasing power parity (PPP) taking into account local rates 
of exchange, India scores higher with US$1,661 billion, the fourth largest in the 
world. As international politics recognises states as the main actors, these figures 
should rank India among the leading ‘powers’ of the world. But from the point of 
view of relative power, these figures are misleading, for the transformation of GNP 
to power must take into account the ability of an actor to mobilise the economy to a 
war economy, and for the population to be able to sustain a war over an indefinite 
period. Seen in this light, the impact of India’s size is modest on her relative power 
position because of the poor performance on the per capita indicator. India ranks 
low in terms of GNP per capita, with a figure of only US$430, far below China’s 
US$750. On social indicators, the picture is just as dismal, for India does rather 
badly on the human development index of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP).11 
 India, with a huge economy and a poor population, thus presents a somewhat 
contradictory picture. The picture has changed since the beginning of liberalisation 
in the early nineties, and the quality of life is slowly going up. But, in terms of 
relative power, this does not help India, for both GNP per capita and the quality of 
life are going up even faster among her competitors. It is also an intensely 
politicised society, and a contentious democracy, which, as will be argued below, 
affects the ratio of potential power to effective force, negatively.  
 With regard to India’s defence outlay, the state spends approximately 3 percent 
of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, amounting in 1998 to only US$14 
per person. By comparison, India’s adversaries spend more. Pakistan spends over 
6.5 percent of national income on the armed forces, and, about US$28 per person, 
while China spends 5.3 percent and US$30 per person.12 In terms of aggregate 
figures, India is usually in the top dozen states in terms of overall military 
expenditures, ranking twelfth in 1999-2000 with spending at about US$14 billion.13 
This is modest compared to China’s US$40 billion or Japan’s US$37 billion, which 
                                                 
11 See Cohen (2001) for details. 
12 See Cohen (2001), p. 29. 
13 These and other figures in the following paragraphs are drawn from the various national 
entries in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1999-2000 
(Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 20, 112, 161-63, 166-67, 186, 300-05. They are 
exclusive of the costs for the nuclear programme. 
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is equivalent to the amount spent by most major European powers. Russia spends 
US$54 billion, but the United States, which spends well over US$250 billion in 
military equipment and personnel is ahead of everyone else. 
 How do these figures translate into actual power? Cohen (2001) mentions a 
multiplier effect of “low wages and generally high quality of Indian armed forces” 
which “magnify the effect of India’s mere US$14 billion in defence spending.” 
India has the largest volunteer military establishment in the world, with well over 
one million regular soldiers, sailors and airmen, and nearly the same number of 
paramilitary forces. But, in terms of effective logistics, as we learn from Mr 
Jaswant Singh’s influential Defending India (1999), a large part of this force is tied 
up with other tasks and as such, should be discounted for when it comes to the 
calculation of national power. “The growing use of the Army for Internal Security 
(IS) duties, senior Army officers fear, has affected the morale and fighting qualities 
of the soldier by realigning his mission and adversary orientation from external to 
internal enemies, which can be potentially very dangerous, blunting his battlefield 
skills - the time he would otherwise spend in training for conventional war is spent 
on IS duties, providing him no rest and respite, and exposing him to, and infecting 
him with, the lax and corrupt values of the police and paramilitary forces. It is not 
the occasional but full-time ‘aid to civil power’ which is the problem.”14 
Singh’s criticism of the Indian strategy of withdrawing troops from the border 
to employ Army personnel for the maintenance of internal security for which the 
Army was not intended, is echoed by the results of a high level inquiry commission 
set up by the Government of India which states that the withdrawal of paramilitary 
(Army) forces from the borders has in the past exacerbated the problems of border 
management (Recommendations of the Group of Ministers (2001), p. 60). This 
internal-external security link persists in recent discussions of India’s security 
management and underscores the necessity for political science to see both themes 
as connected. India’s contentious democracy and the worsening communal 
relations have greatly exacerbated the need for effective policing. The police are a 
State subject under the federal division of powers and, being under the control of 
India’s regional governments, are not always considered politically neutral. At the 
slightest outbreak of communal violence, therefore, there is a clamour for the 
deployment of the army. Already overstretched in view of its engagement with 
anti-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, the Northeast and 
sundry other trouble spots where the state is engaged in fighting Naxalites (a left-
wing guerrilla), the additional demands on its personnel greatly reduce the effective 
fire power of the armed forces. 
In contrast to armed personnel, the situation is marginally better when it comes 
to hardware. As we learn from Cohen (2001, p. 29) India’s armed forces have a 
significant number of armoured vehicles: 4,000 tanks, and about 500 armoured 
personnel carriers organised into 60 tank regiments, almost 200 artillery regiments, 
including a few equipped with short-range “Prithvi” missiles manufactured in 
India. To further improve and to modernize this arsenal, in 2000, India signed the 
biggest MBT-deal in Asia with Russia, which provides for the delivery of no less 
                                                 
14 Singh (1999), p. 262. 
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than 310 modern T-90S Main Battle Tanks, 184 of which will be build in India by 
licence.15 Indian airpower has an edge over Pakistan in terms of numbers, with 
almost double the aircraft (India has 774 combat aircraft, mostly multipurpose 
fighters; Pakistan has only 389). But in comparison, China is better endowed than 
India, with a vast armoured force, more than 8,000 tanks and more than 3,000 
combat aircraft. Ironically, India, China and Pakistan share vintage Soviet air 
technology for a variety of reasons: China because of the old Soviet links in the 
early years after the second world war, India because of the years of close 
collaboration and technology transfer and Pakistan because of the trading relation 
with China! However, Cohen writes that each of these three countries possesses a 
small core of advanced fighters, capable of serving as delivery vehicles for nuclear 
weapons. India and China possess the nuclear-capable Sukhoi 30; India and 
Pakistan each possess a variant of the Mirage 2000, although Pakistan is the only 
air force in this triad that flies the advanced but rapidly ageing American F-16.  
 India had sought in the past to increase her room to manoeuvre against Pakistan 
through diversification in arms procurement which lowers the dependence on any 
particular arms supplier, and through a programme of indigenisation which 
required supply contracts to include a provision for their production in India under 
licence. The 1965 Indo-Pak war had demonstrated the efficacy of this strategy, for 
India, unlike Pakistan, was not dependent on an outside supplier for spare parts, or 
for continued supply. But these advantages, as the paper will argue below, have 
been neutralised through nuclearisation, which has helped Pakistan bridge the 
‘strategic depth’ against India, and the ability of Pakistan to draw on both China 
and the USA against India. In addition, there have been allegations that Indian 
armed forces are suffering from waste and corruption and are under-equipped 
compared even with Pakistan.16 A recent 17 percent increase in defence spending 
will still have a limited impact on India’s power projection capabilities.17  
India and Pakistan are self-declared nuclear powers and their devices, with the 
multiplicator of delivery vehicles must also be factored into the regional military 
balance. China is supposed to have nearly 300 deployed nuclear weapons. While 
the question of deployed nuclear weapons in India is still subject to speculation, 
India is supposed to have the capacity for building between 25 and 100 warheads, 
and Pakistan to have enough fissile material to produce between 10 and 15 
“devices”, although recent reports suggest that Pakistan holds the larger 
inventory.18 It remains unclear as to how many weapons are deployed at a given 
                                                 
15 Zulkarnen (2001), p.18.  
16 See the scathing pre-Kargil critique by a BJP sympathizer, Mohan Guruswamy, 
“Modernise or Perish,” Indian Express, January 26, 1998. After Kargil, he and others 
pointed out the considerable qualitative disadvantages held by India’s larger forces when 
confronted with the Pakistani forces. 
17 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “India’s Military Spending: Prospect for 
Modernization,” Strategic Comments, vol. 6 (July 2000). 
18 For an analysis, confirmed in part by recently retired U.S. officials, see Robert Windrem 
and Tammy Kupperman, “Pakistan Nukes Outstrip India’s, Officials Say,” MSNBC News, 
at (www.msnbc.com/news/417106.asp?cpl=1[January 24, 2001]). “Pakistan, though 
nominally weak (compared to India) is actually stronger than it is commonly perceived.” 
(Tellis 1999, p.730) 
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time, but one can safely assume that both have at least a few devices and could 
produce many more on fairly short notice. China is believed by some Indian 
analysts to have several nuclear weapons deployed in bases in Tibet. As for 
delivery, aircraft still remains the main mode, but Pakistan is assumed to be 
moving toward a missile-based capability. Some experts assert that India lags 
behind Pakistan in this category, with only a few short-range missiles (the Prithvi) 
in its inventory, and a medium-range missile (the Agni) still under development. 
China has nearly seventy medium-range missiles, a few long-range intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and a dozen sea-launched medium-range missiles (India 
has neither an ICBM nor a sea-launch capability, although programs of both are 
under way). Most of these Chinese systems could theoretically target major Indian 
cities or Indian nuclear weapons based in northern and eastern India.19 
In terms of naval power, India’s fleet is smaller than China’s, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that it is better trained and more experienced. Indian ships range 
throughout the Indian Ocean, paying regular calls on ports in East Africa and 
Southeast Asia. Although in terms of quantity, the Indian navy is shrinking, since 
many obsolete vessels are being retired, and although a new carrier20 may be out of 
(financial) reach for the Indian Navy, the quality of the Indian warships is 
gradually improving through the acquisition of Russian Kashin-Class destroyers or 
Russian Granit-SLCMs for their Kilo-Class submarines. So, the Indian Navy may 
currently not be able to conduct sustained operations far from base (for example in 
the South China Sea), but it is definitely well positioned to defend India’s interests 
in the Bay of Bengal and in the Arabian Sea. 
As far as India is concerned, a brief perusal of her nuclear programme quickly 
reveals a long, expensive engagement with technical development but without the 
backing of a well conceptualised doctrine.21 The programme started way back in 
1944, with the founding of the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research under the 
leadership of the noted physicist Homi J. Bhabha who had the ear of Nehru. The 
original intention was to use nuclear research as a source of energy which nicely 
dovetailed into Nehru’s economic plans for self-sufficiency in energy-deficient 
India. In 1948 the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established. In 1956 and 
1960 the first two civilian nuclear reactors were opened. An inconclusive national 
debate about exercising this option ensued, chiefly between Homi Bhabha and 
V.K. Menon, India’s defence minister. China tested its nuclear bomb for the first 
time in 1964. India, with enough nuclear material and the necessary technology, 
has the option of “going nuclear” for the first time in 1965. However, no clear 
policy evolved during these politically turbulent times of India. From 1968 
onwards a second nuclear debate begins due to pressure from the West, the Soviet 
Union and Japan to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India 
                                                 
19 Cohen (2001), p. 30. See Perkovich (1999) for a detailed account of the development of 
India’s nuclear programme. For a projection of future growth of India’s nuclear weapons 
programme, see Tellis (1999), p.720. 
20 Some sources like Jane’s Navy International (January 2001) inform us that the Indian 
Navy is in the process of acquiring the ex-Soviet aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, though 
the deal remains unfinalised to this date . 
21 See Cohen (2001), pp. 157-171. 
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developed the counter argument of the “discriminatory” international nuclear order. 
In 1974 India tested a ‘peaceful nuclear device’ for the first time at Pokhran. 
During the 1970s India gained respect for its nuclear advances but failed to develop 
a plan for the future policies on nuclearisation. The 1980s show India developing a 
nuclear doctrine (Jasjit Singh 1997) of “recessed deterrence”, meaning 
nuclearisation to a point where deployable weapons can be produced at very short 
notice, but short of full weaponization, since the threat of that should suffice 
politically. This form of nuclearisation has gained a following, an open 
nuclearisation was believed to help stabilise the region and to fend off political 
intruders in the region, in India’s “natural sphere” of influence. 
The bomb gradually came to acquire the aura of a symbol of India’s power. 
Support for this view ranged from the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party to 
others, including the socialist George Fernandes, originally opposed to the bomb, 
but even more opposed to the bullying by other nuclear powers. The 
‘Subrahmanyam logic’, so-called after the most celebrated Indian ‘hawk’, 
pressuring the “nuclear haves” into disarmament while protecting India against 
nuclear blackmail of nuclearisation (dating back to the mid-1970s) still applies 
today to India’s official position.  
The push towards nuclearisation appears to have been authorised by Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the late eighties after his own de-nuclearisation initiative 
was cold-shouldered by western powers. In Indian eyes, from 1990 on Pakistan 
was considered a nuclear weapons state. From 1995 to 1997 the NPT/Arms Control 
Regime became greatly tightened, threatening closer scrutiny of India’s nuclear 
programme. The advent of the Bharatiya Janata Party to power turned the bomb 
into a symbol of Indian nationhood and an act of peaceful resistance to 
international bullying. The integration of India’s search for power and her 
nuclearisation is however far from complete. In Cohen’s view, if at all India is to 
be viewed as a major power, it is “despite [and] not because of its overt nuclear 
capabilities.”22 
The last variable that needs to be taken into consideration with regard to 
national power is ‘morale’, that ultimate force-multiplier, which Cohen holds to be 
high in the case of India.23 But still, the sum of parts is less than the whole. Pulling 
all these factors together, Cohen concludes that “for the past several decades, India 
has had a weak or at least highly variable reputation, as judged by the ability to 
influence without attempting to exercise influence, ... one that is easily written off 
as a regional power.”24 India’s relative weakness was not fully visible at the height 
of the Cold War. Inevitably, her ranking has been adversely affected by the decline 
of the Soviet Union, though the fact does not appear to have been fully registered 
                                                 
22 Cohen (2001), p. 197. 
23 “ It is more difficult to measure the relative quality of Indian forces, since much depends 
on leadership, both civilian and military. However, the Indian military, when adequately led 
and given a clear and reasonable objective, can obviously perform extremely well, albeit at 
a low to intermediate level of technological sophistication. The Indian armed forces 
certainly compare favourably with those of Pakistan and China, although they would have a 
hard time coping with naval or air units from a truly advanced military power.”  
24 Cohen (2001), p. 26. 
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by Indian policy makers. India, of course, continues to be regarded wearily by her 
neighbours but any comparison with her neighbours is seen by Indian policy 
makers as condescending towards India and unappreciative of her true power.  
India’s ambiguous profile results from the hiatus between self-perception and 
the evaluation by others. This is compounded by the contradiction between 
nostalgic self-perception as a major player in the international arena at par with 
China, the real attainment of which would require a commensurate strategic 
engagement, and the current commitments in South Asia which restrict her 
strategic vision and engagement basically to the region. This hiatus between the 
perception of India and her self-perception also causes her to shuttle uneasily 
between grandstanding on the one hand, and inexplicable acquiescence with 
situations that are contrary to her interests or declared principles on the other, 
lowering, in the process, her credibility even further. 
Thus, though India, buoyed by the aspirations of her increasingly vocal middle 
class has been reaching out for a global market and a global role, in terms of 
power-ranking, the intentions have not become a reality. As Sandy Gordon 
suggests, the complexity and difficulty of the South Asian environment, have 
forced India’s attention to focus more on the problems associated with its 
immediate neighbourhood and on nation-building than those of the Indian Ocean 
region, let alone the world. “This fact is not without irony. While it is the problems 
of the neighbourhood that have largely driven India’s military build-up, it is also 
those very problems that continue to limit its strategic reach.”25 
With regard to the Asian strategic landscape, thus, India’s position remains 
unspecified. While quite clearly the leading military power on the subcontinent, 
India is not accepted as the paramount power. Indeed, the Indian analyst Raju 
Thomas argues that “India does not yet have clear superiority in the event of a 
combined attack by Pakistan and China, a point borne out by the situation on the 
border with Pakistan, where because of demands on Indian forces elsewhere, 
Pakistan is still able to match India almost division for division.”26 Currently, as the 
trusted ally of the USA, the ban on the supply of arms lifted, the General 
resoundingly voted in as President, though the October elections might still throw a 
spanner in the works, Pakistan is in a strong position militarily vis-à-vis India. 
India has been making efforts to counter this by attempting to revive closer 
relations with Russia and undertaking high level diplomatic exchanges with China. 
But then, from Pakistan’s point of view, this is more than balanced by the growing 
weakness of the NDA government of Delhi, fraught with religious tension in India, 
and the beleaguered position of Prime Minister Vajpayee within his own party, 
facing a growing challenge from more robust proponents of hindutva. 
What does this make out of India in so far as her rank is concerned? Cohen’s 
cryptic description of India as “a different great power”, being as unspecific as her 
status as an ‘emerging’ power, is not of much help. But his detailed reasoning is 
certainly worth reproducing in full. 
 
                                                 
25 See Babbage and Gordon (1992), p. 171. 
26 Babbage and Gordon (1992), p. 172. 
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Although India’s ability to extend its military power or play a 
balancing role elsewhere remains relatively modest, this power is 
increasing, as is the skill with which that power is now wielded. In the 
economic arena, Indian influence is mixed: while it does have 
significant capabilities in advanced and high technology, it was slow 
to develop an export capability of any consequence. This, also, is 
changing. On balance, India has long been regarded as a state that has 
failed to live up to expectations. Indians, of course, argue that there 
are reasons for this lack of performance, the primary being that New 
Delhi remains enmeshed in a needless conflict with Pakistan that 
prevents it from becoming a major power. But even the propensity to 
blame others for India’s ills is changing, and a new sense of 
confidence has become apparent in the past several years. 
Though India may be the weakest of the great states and still unable to 
do some important things, it is capable of surprises. It cannot be 
ignored, but neither will it act like a great power at all times. Like 
China, which periodically pleads that it is still a ”third world” state, 
India will have one foot in the ”developing” world and one in the 
world of advanced economic and military powers for the indefinite 
future.27 
 
T H E  I N D I A N  S T R A T E G I C  D O C T R I N E  
 
The strategic doctrine of a country is an indispensable instrument for the effective 
measurement of its ranking, for the strategic vision, calculations and propensities 
towards risk-taking that the doctrine contains, provide important clues to the 
transformation of potential power into effective force. Panchasheela, the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence to which Jawaharlal Nehru gave an institutional 
expression in terms of the Non-aligned Movement provided a complete if not 
coherent statement of India’s strategic doctrine at the height of the Cold War.28 
However, though the Nehruvian consensus has lost its aura as much in India’s 
domestic politics as in her international affairs, no single coherent doctrine has 
emerged to take its place. New generations of policy makers, voters, parties and 
major changes in the regional and international contexts have influenced the 
development of strategic thinking. Each of the major wars of South Asia, or war-
like incidents mentioned by Jaswant Singh (table 1) have sparked off both bouts of 
doctrine elaboration by the government and political controversies around them. 
Our search for a strategic doctrine would draw on the discourse that these incidents 
gave rise to in Indian politics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Cohen (2001), p. 35. 
28 See Mansingh (1984), pp. 13-25 for a brief review of the core principles of non-
alignment and the modifications made to them by Indira Gandhi. 
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Table 1 
 
MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OF INDIA (1947-97)29 
 
A. Inter-State Wars 
 
 1947-48 The First Indo-Pak Conflict 
 1962  Sino-Indian Border War 
 1965  The Second Indo-Pak War 
 1971   The Third Indo-Pak War: Creation of Bangladesh 
 
B. Other Internal Military Operations 
 
1947 Punjab Boundary Force 
1947 Junagarh deployment 
1948 Hyderabad police action 
1961 Liberation of Goa 
1984 Operation Bluestar 
 
C. Counter-insurgency Operations 
 
 1954-74 Anti-insurgency operations in Nagaland 
 1965-67 Anti-insurgency operations in Mizoram 
 1971  Anti-insurgency operations in Tripura and Mizoram. 
 1985-90 Anti-terrorist deployments in Punjab 
 1989-  Anti-terrorist deployments in Jammu & Kashmir 
 1991  Anti-insurgency operation in Assam: 
    Operation Rhino 
 
As things stood at the outset, foreign policy and strategic planning were almost 
exclusively in the hands of Nehru and his close advisers during his tenure as Prime 
Minister until 1964. More recently, this formerly relatively closed circle of policy 
experts has opened up to allow regional political forces (which have come to wield 
influence as coalition partners at the centre) to air their respective views on 
strategic planning. Essentially, for Cohen defence and strategic planning has come 
from one voice (Nehru’s) in the early years to many voices and coalitions in more 
recent times. 
The Nehruvian Tradition of strategic thinking, which went through many 
metamorphoses under his successors, namely Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66), 
Indira Gandhi (1966-77, 80-84) and Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89), represents a mix of 
liberal internationalism and a “strong state” approach. It was originally 
characterised by a sceptical view of the US and a reliance on the Soviet Union and 
                                                 
29 Jaswant Singh (1999), pp. 142-143. 
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support for other anticolonial movements. Nehru acknowledged the problems 
facing a weak state in the international system and consequently aimed at co-
operation where possible and necessary. The “Militant Nehruvians” entered the 
scene after India’s defeat in the 1962 Indo-Chinese border war. They shared 
Nehru’s suspicion of the unbalanced international power system but rather endorse 
the use of force. They emphasised threats to India. Subcontinental dominance 
became the goal of foreign policy. Pakistan, China and the US were seen as 
essentially hostile towards India. This thinking persisted from 1972 to about 1992. 
According to Cohen, the Nehruvian origins of strategic thinking in post-
independence India have been enriched by two additional currents which he calls, 
respectively, realists and revitalists, to distinguish them from the overall idealism 
of Jawaharlal Nehru. The realists started as offshoots from the generally liberal, 
market oriented, pro-American Swatantra party in the mid-1960s. The realists 
(Cohen counts foreign minister Jaswant Singh and K.C. Pant, one-time Special 
Envoy to Kashmir (now the Deputy Chief of the Planning Commission), as 
examples), share with Nehruvians the belief in India’s inherent greatness and with 
militant Nehruvians an inclination towards the use of force when perceived 
necessary. They hold a more pragmatic view of Sino-Indian and Indo-US relations. 
Realists support increased economic openness and integration with the 
international market forces. The revitalists take a more regional perspective, 
stemming from their preoccupation with indianizing South Asia, which they see as 
essentially the main theatre of action for Indian foreign policy. They, like the 
realists deem nuclearization necessary. For Cohen the modern synthesis of realist 
and revitalist perspectives is Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.30 
Nehru saw himself first and foremost as a great moderniser and as such, social 
and economic development was the cornerstone of his political thinking. Defence 
as a political and strategic issue was mainly used to advance these objectives. 
Nehru was deeply distrustful of the military as such and the Indian military 
establishment. Not surprisingly, no coherent security doctrine developed during the 
period of Nehru’s stewardship, non-alignment being an overall guide to the ways 
and means of avoiding conflict rather than a strategy of the enhancement of 
national power and security. India established good neighbourly relations with her 
smaller neighbours on the basis of treaties with Bhutan 1949, Sikkim 1950, Nepal 
1950, Burma 1951 and Ceylon 1954/1964. Force, during this phase was used 
primarily for domestic purposes, the invasion of Goa in 1961 being the exception. 
The period during the Indo-China war of 1962 and the Indo-Pak war of 1971 
caused a major re-thinking, for India had to conceptualise the possibility of a war 
on two fronts. The increase in defence allocation during this period, and increased 
military co-operation with the West saw the beginning of a greater security 
consciousness. After Indira Gandhi came to power in 1966 she displayed a greater 
willingness to link politics and military affairs. She also turned India firmly in the 
direction of the Soviet Union with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Co-operation, signed on 9 August 1971. After 1971, the balance of power in South 
Asia was altered significantly, with the defeat of Pakistan in 1971, the emergence 
                                                 
30 Cohen (2001), p. 47. 
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of Bangladesh and the “peaceful nuclear explosion” of 1974 which gave yet 
another indication of an ‘Indira Doctrine’, which visualised India as the hegemonic 
power of South Asia.31 
The defeat of Indira Gandhi in the Parliamentary elections of 1977 and the 
ushering in of the first Janata government in Delhi under the leadership of Morarji 
Desai, seen at that time as pro-American, tilted the balance away from the Soviet 
Union, but at the same time, introduced another dose of uncertainty to India’s 
strategic vision. This changed again in 1980 with the return of Indira, but the 
period of 1980 to 1984 saw India isolated, and funds for defence spending getting 
scarce. Increased US support to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan 
saw India’s return to reliance on the Soviet Union and greater Soviet arms imports 
in India. 
In retrospect, the period that intervened during the two assassinations, of Indira 
Gandhi in 1984 by her Sikh body guards and Rajiv Gandhi by Tamil terrorists in 
1989, were one of continued Indira ‘doctrine’ which saw attempts to expand 
India’s influence in South Asia and hostility towards China, Pakistan and the US 
grew stronger. Missile programmes were initiated after 1983 and defence spending 
doubled from 1980 to 1989. Operations Siachen (1984) and Brasstacks (1986-87) 
occurred. Support was lent to the Tamil Tigers (1987-90) and an Indian 
intervention in Male took place in 1988.  
Though the onset of liberalisation of the Indian economy in 1991 prepared the 
ground for a rapprochement with the United States, the contradictory pulls within 
India’s strategic thinking continued from 1990 to 1999. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union necessitated a radical change in policy, while economic reforms in India 
necessitated budget cuts, affecting the military adversely. This might have opened 
a window of opportunity for Pakistan, which, taking advantage of the onset of 
militancy in Kashmir started supporting cross border insurgency in Kashmir and 
covert military operations. While on the political front the unilateralist Gujral 
doctrine and subsequently, the BJP initiatives for a diplomatic deal with Pakistan 
first of the Lahore bus trip and subsequently the Agra summit continued, the 
Pakistani military operated on more conservative lines and sought to take 
advantage of the perceived weakness of the Indian military establishment. One 
consequence was the war in Kargil in 1999, but the forceful reaction of India’s 
army once again underscored the need for a coherent Indian strategic doctrine. 
The conceptual disarray and the lack of strategic vision that characterise Indian 
thinking on strategic and security issues to this point, in Jaswant Singh’s view, can 
be attributed partly to the lack of mapping skills, geographical knowledge of the 
North-east and North-west frontiers but to a great degree to the perceived lack of 
necessity with regard to the exact delineation of India’s external borders in 
continuation with the practice during the British colonial period. It was seen as 
contrary to British interests to have exact borders. The British found the separation 
of their spheres of influence from those of their rivals through “buffer zones” as a 
more effective strategy. The continuation of this policy, however, assumed the 
continuation of the power that the British were able to mobilise as an imperial 
                                                 
31 See Mansingh (1984). 
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power. The continuation of these soft frontiers, particularly with China was to be a 
major contributory cause to the conflict of 1962.32 
All modern states, as Tilly has argued, seek to develop an integrated security 
doctrine that combines internal and external security, basically to safeguard the 
interests of the ruling elites.33 That India did not go in that direction during the 
crucial two decades following independence is an issue of great theoretical interest. 
Could this be the consequence of the lack of a strategic culture in India?  
The issue has been investigated at length by Jaswant Singh. The fact that 
though India is a full-fledged state with all the rights and obligations due to a state 
under the conventions of the international system and still one has to discuss why 
India has not pursued national power like others is of particular significance. It 
arises in this form primarily because of the attribution of a non-strategic, spiritual 
culture to India by colonial anthropology. In its loose, idealistic formulation, 
Panchasheela appears to give institutional form to this non-strategic attitude. 
Singh, taking issue against this reading of Indian history, shows how, buried under 
the layers of spiritual rhetoric and rituals there was a strategic culture and 
appropriate institutions in pre-modern India. As a key member of the current 
government and one of its main strategists, Singh argues that the present 
government has been able to build on this basis in order to bring in a new 
institutional arrangement, leading to a new organigram of security management.  
Since the existence of a tradition of strategic culture in India is not often 
acknowledged by specialists in the field, it is important to take cognisance of it at 
this stage. The evidence that Singh builds his assertions on comes chiefly from 
Kautilya’s Arthaśastra, a text on governance that has been traced to four centuries 
before Christ. The text has an obsessive occupation with “spies, secrets, and 
treachery. When listing the virtues of a king, Kautilya includes, along with energy, 
controlling his sensual nature, cultivating his intellect, and associating with his 
elders, the need to keep ‚a watchful eye by means of spies’.”34 Kautilya gave great 
importance to gathering intelligence.  
 
This establishment of spies to be created to serve the king should 
include the apostate monk, the seeming householder, the 
seeming trader, the seeming ascetic, as well as the secret agent 
                                                 
32 Jaswant Singh (1999), p. 186.  
33 As Skocpol and Charles Tilly, suggest “If protection rackets represent crime at its 
smoothest, then war making and state making - quintessential protection rackets with the 
added advantage of legitimacy - qualify as our largest example of organized crime. Tilly 
then goes on to define the functions of states in terms of the following: War making: 
Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear 
and continuous priority as wielders of force; State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their 
rivals inside those territories; Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their 
clients; Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities - war 
making, state making, and protection.” “War Making and State Making as Organized 
Crime” See Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the 
State Back in (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985) (p. 169, emphasis added). 
34 Jaswant Singh (1999), p. 12. 
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[the brave, the poison-giver, and the benign nun]’. They should 
spy on the councillors, the chaplain, the commander-in-chief, the 
crown-prince, the chief palace usher, the chief of the palace 
guards, the director, the administrator, the director of stores, the 
commandant, the city judge, the director of factories, the council 
of ministers, the superintendents, the chief of the army staff, the 
commandant of the fort, the commandant of the frontier-fort, the 
forest chieftain too, and that also in his own territory.35 
 
Exactly why India’s strategic tradition failed to develop on the same lines as the 
modern state in the west is a larger debate on India’s state tradition, which need 
not detain us here. The important point here is that the loss of autonomy in the 
wake of foreign invasion caused India’s strategic culture to get internalised, and 
got obsessed with the curbing the enemy within rather than combating external 
foes. This, Singh contends, “created a yawning chasm of mutual suspicion 
between the state and the citizen. This signal failure, the establishment of a 
confident, viable and efficient Indian state, nourished by effective institutional 
instruments, and sustained by a willing and co-operative citizenry has become a 
political and cultural trait; it both prescribes the form and constricts the 
functioning of the Indian state, even today. In the process it has prevented India 
from developing a proper strategic doctrine.” 
The ‘rediscovery’ of India’s strategic culture has now become the basis of an 
avid discourse within India’s security establishment. Singh’s Defending India 
(1999) in a way has set the pace but there are several other texts (Air Commodore 
Jasjit Singh’s Asian Security in the 21st Century, 1999) that have come out with 
institutional arrangements that base themselves on this revival of India’s security 
culture. Jaswant Singh’s evocation of how this security culture formed the basis of 
the continuation of Indian resistance to foreign aggression is of great interest. 
 
The remarkable aspect is not that this pacifist thought developed but 
that despite it so much else about warfare as an instrument of policy, 
about the craft of war, about valour and heroism remained. That 
despite the combined cultural influences of such pacifist faiths, 
Islamic conquest of just parts of India needed many centuries of strife; 
that even at the height of its glory and spread the Mughal Empire did 
not encompass the whole of India, and that it was in reality not so 
much a ‘Mughal’ empire as a political-military alliance, a coalition of 
the principal Rajput feudatories of the period and the Mughals. 
...These were, by any standards, achievements which were not 
possible without a highly developed sense of military craft; but of a 
larger strategic culture, alas, they remained largely innocent. As 
Jadunath Sarkar, the foremost Indian historian of ancient and Mughal 
military affairs, has observed, ‘these armies were largely levy, 
improvised for national defence under threat of invasion’, and while 
                                                 
35 Jaswant Singh (1999), p. 13. 
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‘the Indian defenders were brave… each man fought to the death in 
isolation ...’36  
 
Quoting extensively from the writings of the main actors involved in some of 
India’s recent security issues, particularly the disastrous experience of the Indian 
Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, Singh shows the negative consequences of the 
absence of a clear strategic doctrine. The result of the new thinking, and the rise to 
power and influence of a new defence elite are major changes in the institutional 
arrangement of Indian security. Partly under the impulse of this new thinking, the 
BJP-led government of India set up a Group of Ministers (GoM) whose 
recommendations have now come up with the rudiments of a strategic doctrine. 
The report takes the first comprehensive look at all challenges to the national 
security of India, both internal and external. Members of the group of ministers 
were L.K. Advani (then-Home), George Fernandes (then-Defense), Jaswant Singh 
(then-External) and Yashwant Sinha (then-Finance). Its task was the identification 
of problems and possible solutions in the areas of intelligence, internal security, 
border management and defence. 
The report employs a new (at least in India) concept of national security which 
defines four elements as being conditional for its existence: military might, 
economic strength, internal cohesion and technological prowess (p.6). This marks a 
departure from the former equation of national security with military power.  The 
report states the necessity for an overhaul of the national security system since it is 
identified as being essentially 50 years old. A pragmatic view is taken on the 
lasting US status as the sole superpower (p. 7): 
 
US pre-eminence in the global strategic architecture is unlikely to 
diminish in the foreseeable future. Meaningful broad-based 
engagement with the United States spanning political, economic and 
technological interests and commonalties, will impact beneficially on 
our external security concerns with a resultant albeit less visible 
impact on our internal security environment. 
 
Non-state actors, particularly terrorists, are identified as one of the main targets of 
future activity in enhancing the national security profile of India. China and 
Pakistan are mentioned as the main concerns in the report. “The rapid economic 
growth of China in the last few years coupled with its ambitious military 
modernisation programme will enable it to attain near superpower status by 2020. 
[...] Special note must be taken of China’s wide-ranging defence modernisation 
with a special focus on force-multipliers and high technology weapon systems.” 
“Pakistan will continue to pose a threat to India’s security in the future also. Its 
traditional hostility and single-minded aim of destabilising India, is not focused just 
on Kashmir but on a search for parity [...] As a result of Pakistan’s political and 
economic instability, its military regime may act irrationally, particularly in view 
of its propensity to function through terrorist outfits […] Pakistan believes that 
                                                 
36 Jaswant Singh (1999), p. 15. 
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nuclear weapons can compensate for ‘conventional military inferiority’; its leaders 
have not concealed their desire to use nuclear weapons against India.”37 
The discussion of the assumptions that go into Pakistani decision-making are 
indicative of the thinking at the high-test level of the government of India with 
regard to the Indian strategic doctrine. There is every indication that there are 
similar deliberations in process with regard to China as well. In view of the 
sensitivity of the issue, the declassified report has withheld this information, but the 
report makes an oblique reference to the unsettled problems with regard to China 
through a general reference to the problems of India’s borders which are undefined 
and undemarcated on the ground. The report acknowledges that disputed and 
unsettled  borders are matters of contention. In addition, it mentions the porousness 
of borders due to their artificial character (i.e., not necessarily corresponding to 
natural boundaries), lack of clear accountability for border security, command and 
control problems arising out of divided responsibility among too many different 
forces deemed to be responsible for border management duties, and finally, the 
unsatisfactory equipment situation, lacking in night vision and surveillance 
capacity are mentioned as major problems facing India’s security management. 
The report makes explicit references to the lack of synchronisation among and 
between the three departments in the MoD, including the relevant elements of 
Defence Finance.  
 
The functioning of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) has, to 
date, revealed serious weaknesses in its ability to provide single 
military advice to the government, and resolve substantive inter-
Service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues adequately. 
[…]The present system governing Defence acquisitions suffers from a 
lack of integrated planning[…]. Ideally, the Government’s national 
security objectives should lead to a formulation of defence objectives, 
which, in turn, define defence policy and the directives of the Defence 
Minister. This is not the case at present. […]The defence planning 
process is greatly handicapped by the absence of a national security 
doctrine[…]. Military capability cannot exist in isolation from broader 
societal trends and many of the factors that buttress the military ethos 
are at odds with trends in civilian society. As transparency increases 
and an active media highlights the business of military life, the ability 
to maintain a different but acceptable military ethos has come under 
strain. Finding, identifying, educating, motivating and retaining 
quality manpower has become difficult and steps need to be taken to 
optimise the attractiveness of a Service career. […] There is also no 
synergy between academic research and Government’s requirements. 
Whereas academic research is carried out more or less in a policy 
vacuum, official agencies undertake their policy making tasks in the 
                                                 
37 GoM Report (2001), p. 10. 
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absence of the wealth of information available with the academic 
community.38 
Extensive reforms are suggested, including, the intensification of defence 
production and increased efficiency and profitability, involvement of the private 
sector, improvement of the Indian Army’s image by enhancing media and public 
relations and  professional dissemination of information on India and its military 
(power, interests, past campaigns). The Report also incorporates the 
recommendations which came out of the Kargil Review Committee’s work in its 
appendices. They include inter alia the recommendation of an image overhaul for 
the Indian army and many suggestions which were taken up by the GoM in the 
present report.39 
The new structure can be represented in terms of the following organigram. 
(see Figure 1) 
                                                 
38 GoM Report (2001), pp. 96-99. 
39 GoM Report (2001), pp. 121-123. 
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The main objective of the innovations in India’s security management apparatus is 
to provide what the GoM refer to as ‘single military advice’, the failure of which 
has been pointed out by astute observers like Rohan Gunaratna as one of the 
contributing factors to the failure of the IPKF to subdue the Tamil Tigers and to 
some extent, the failure of India to make a headway in Kashmir. The new 
institutional arrangement of Indian security seeks to achieve a greater unity of 
purpose and focus in implementation through co-ordination among the three wings 
of the military forces, the paramilitary, the security services of the State 
governments and the various civilian agencies responsible for policy formulation, 
procurement and implementation. But, how likely are the innovations in the 
security management structure likely to be effective? 
The institutional innovations for greater co-ordination have been greeted by 
India’s top military brass as positive developments.40 But in view of the lack of 
inter-party consensus about the core parameters of the security doctrine (witness 
the controversy over Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, for example) and the 
contradictory attitudes that characterise Indian public opinion, the likelihood of 
effective implementation of the security doctrine in the coherent form in which it is 
conceptualised by the Group of Ministers Report (2001), and given institutional 
form in the organigram, appears rather low. 
India’s active media and contentious democracy provide effective conditions 
for an influential role of Indian public opinion in the formulation and 
implementation of strategic decisions. The relatively low number of people in the 
data reported in Table-2, who claim not to have heard the names of countries of the 
region, considering the fact that the data were gleaned from a national random 
sample of the Indian electorate (CSDS National Election Study, Post-Poll Survey 
1999), show first of all that Indian security and foreign policy are both firmly in the 
realm of national political consciousness, a fact that no government in politically 
contentious India can afford to ignore. But, while the Indian public appear to 
conscious of the problem of security, what do they really want from their 
government? The data, reported in Table-3, show a public that is agitated but 
indecisive. Whereas Table-2 shows the perception of Pakistan as India’s ‘public 
enemy number one’, with regard to the right course of action to follow, the Indian 
public is surprisingly conciliatory. Significantly many more people agree that 
‘India should make efforts to develop friendly relations with Pakistan’ compared to 
those who disagree.41 On the general issue of “war as the only solution to Indo-
Pakistan problem”, the number of those who disagree far exceeds those who agree 
(while, a substantial number express no opinion), but these conciliatory and peace-
like opinions are contradicted by the strong support for “increased spending on the 
                                                 
40 Interview with former Chairman of the Indian Chiefs of Staff Committee, General V.P. 
Malik (Retd.), Bonn, 11 April 2002.  
41 This finding is comparable in greater support for conciliation with Pakistan rather than 
war also reported in the findings of the National Election Survey of 1996. See Mitra and 
Singh (1999), p. 149. 
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army even if it increases the burden on ordinary people”, with over half of the total 
sample agreeing to the proposition and less than a fifth expressing their 
disagreement.  
 
Table 2. Public Opinion on State-to-State Relations 
 
Now I will read the names of some 
countries. Have you heard the name of 
these countries? 
                
                             Yes                     No 
   (If yes) How is their relationship  
   with India- Friend, neither friend nor  
   enemy or enemy? 
    Friend                Neither            Enemy 
 
Nepal 
 
65.3 
 
34.7 
 
41.3 
 
16.8 
 
1.7 
 
America 
 
 
70.3 
 
29.7 
 
27.1 
 
25.9 
 
11.1 
Pakistan 
 
82.9 17.1 6.9 7.4 64.2 
Bangladesh 
 
65.5 34.5 32.5 21.4 5.7 
China 
 
64.3 35.7 21.7 23.4 13.0 
Sri Lanka 
 
66.5 33.5 36.1 21.0 3.3 
Russia 61.9 38.1 42.1 12.7 1.4 
      
 
Table 3. Public Opinion on Security Issues 
Q: Now I will talk about some specific issues on which different people have 
different opinions. I will read out some statements to which you may agree or 
disagree. 
Statements Agree No Opinion Disagree 
India should make efforts 
to develop friendly relations with Pakistan.  
Do you… 
 
42.4 
 
33.9 
 
23.7 
 
Country should increase spending on army  
even if it increases the burden on  
ordinary people.  
Do you… 
 
 
50.1 
 
 
32.6 
 
 
17.3 
 
War is the only solution to Indo-Pakistan 
problem.  
Do you… 
 
 
25.2 
 
 
35.6 
 
 
39.1 
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P R O G N O S I S  
 
Sophisticated observers of the Indian scene like Stephen Cohen and Sandy Gordon 
have reported on India’s ambitions for great power status. At least in terms of 
rhetoric, quite discernibly, an attitude to that effect often lurks behind the moral 
postures and grandstanding by India’s leaders, when they are asked to pronounce 
themselves on global problems. How much of this is empty rhetoric and should 
necessarily be discounted for Indian garrulity, and how much of it is for real, which 
India’s counter players can ignore only at their peril? This section attempts to 
answer this question with reference to a series of specific issues. 
 
I n d i a  a n d  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S y s t e m  
 
At the height of the Cold War, Panchasheela, the ‘five principles of peaceful 
coexistence’, spelt out the ideal state of an international system from the Indian 
point of view. The ideal scenario for India was to be a world of largely status quo 
powers where just national interests would be mediated through international law, 
arbitration and fair use of the natural resources of the world. In such a perfect 
world, it was assumed by Nehru, India, whose commitment to the third way 
between the east and the west, communism and capitalism, hallowed by the legacy 
of Aśoka and Gandhi, would play an important role, one that the world would see 
as both natural and legitimate. Major powers would act responsibly to keep order 
and promote justice in their parts of the globe. International politics would be 
governed by mature and responsible states that would not meddle in the affairs of 
others.42 In his terse description of Indian expectations during the early years after 
Independence when the foundations of her foreign policy were being laid, Cohen 
points out how little thought Indians gave to how the policies of such states could 
be co-ordinated or how deviance from the system by rogue states could be 
sanctioned. The fact that India got a hearing in international conflicts and played a 
mediating role with some distinction was attributed to the inherent virtue of the 
Indian position and not to contextual factors such as the bipolar world where India 
played a pivotal role. The Nehruvians, taken in by the hectoring tone and 
pedagogical intents of their leader, assumed that the Soviets were committed to 
peace and that the United States would eventually retreat to its own hemisphere 
and cease its interference elsewhere around the world. Failing that, in the short 
term, the United States and to a lesser extent its allies and dependencies, such as 
Japan, could possibly be “educated” into the proper norms of international 
behaviour.43 
                                                 
42 See Cohen (2001), p. 55. 
43 Cohen’s comments on this Indian folie du grandeur are characteristically harsh but 
accurate. “The cold war .... allowed India to play (in its own eyes) an exaggerated role on 
the international stage for many years, where it could moralize about the inequities of 
bipolarity and the “cold war mentality” while still benefiting materially and politically from 
its ties to both the Soviet Union and the United States and its skill at playing one against the 
other.” See Cohen (2001), p. 55. 
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During the Cold War India could afford to sit on the fence rather than entering a 
conflict or siding with one bloc or another, rationalising its nonengagement in 
moral terms. Similarly, Cohen explains, India, a large, important and democratic 
power, did not need to join an alliance. However, the emergence of Sino-Soviet 
rivalry, the decline of global bipolarity, and most crucially, the humiliating defeat 
of India in the 1962 Indo-China conflict forced India to rethink many of the 
assumptions that went into the Panchasheela. The positioning of India in the 
international arena today requires nothing short of two paradigm-shifts, from non-
alignment to a world based on alliances, and from a state-centric mode of thinking 
to an international arena where non-state actors are an increasingly important 
presence.  
India does not have much of a choice with regard to holding aloof from the 
world. Her declared status as a nuclear power invites an engagement by the world, 
which her poverty and peacelike gestures of an earlier period did not. Her 
commitment to liberalisation of the economy, while opening up opportunities for 
her vigorous and vibrant middle classes, also puts an obligation on the part of the 
government to engage with the rich, capitalist world. The Hindu nationalist 
sentiments of her government require her to engage with states where overseas 
Indian communities, or Hindu minorities are under grave threat. Finally, being 
energy-deficient, India needs to maintain good ties with some of the major oil 
producers, whose sympathies are mainly with Pakistan. 
 
G l o b a l  a n d  R e g i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  R e g i m e s  
 
Under the impact of the new contextual and indigenous developments, India is re-
examining its approach to international and regional organisations. Nehru was a 
great supporter of international peacekeeping and mediation initiatives44 and, a 
staunch advocate of Asian regional co-operation, it was Nehru who organised the 
Asian Relations Conference even before India achieved independence. In the new 
scheme of things, with much of the world clamouring for mediation in Kashmir, 
and India holding out obstinately, claiming that Kashmir is an internal problem of 
India, the Indian position needs to be looked at seriously afresh. This holds out 
both a challenge and an opportunity. The United Nations, as Cohen suggests, can 
be a dangerous place for India where, if Kashmir comes to a vote in the General 
Assembly, “India runs the risk of having its Kashmir policies come under critical 
scrutiny, and perhaps fresh UN resolutions, and even sanctions.”45 On the other 
hand, a proper deal can expedite India’s case for a seat on the Security Council. 
The problem is similar in nature though different in scale with regard to India’s 
security links with her South Asian neighbours. Although the remote sources of 
India’s insecurity often lie within the territories of her neighbours, India has so far 
refused to have the issues discussed as a common problem of South Asia, 
preferring, instead, to take things up at the bilateral level. There is a structural 
                                                 
44 In fact, the Constitution of India mandates co-operation with international bodies, 
including the United Nations. See Constitution of India, Article 51. 
45 Cohen (2001), p. 55. 
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problem here that India needs to solve. As Cohen points out, regional co-operation 
will only work when one of two conditions exists. The first is the presence of a 
benevolent, dominant regional power that can regulate regional behaviour, or the 
existence of a set of regional players with roughly similar resource endowments, or 
similar threat perceptions from outside the region. The leading role of the United 
States in the western hemisphere, and the successful regional organisations in 
Europe and South East Asia are pointed out as examples of these conditions. 
However, neither condition obtains in South Asia.46 A successful solution to the 
issue of joint management of security threats at the regional level will reduce 
India’s security burden and increase her support from regional powers at the 
international arena, but, for reasons to be discussed below, India might not find it 
easy to move in that direction. 
 
I n d i a ,  P a k i s t a n  a n d  K a s h m i r  
 
For all purposes, India is at war in Kashmir. It is a war of attrition, which India 
cannot manage to win and Pakistan cannot afford to lose. South Asian discourse on 
this issue is particularly rich in analogies and allusions. Cohen cites an observation 
by G. Parthasarathy, a former adviser to Indira Gandhi, that an India-Pakistan 
reconciliation is like trying to treat two patients whose only disease is an allergy to 
each other.47 An all-party resolution of the Indian Parliament, voted unanimously 
by the Lok Sabha in 1995, affirms Kashmir as an integral part of Indian territory 
and Kashmir as India’s internal problem. Any move away from that, liable to be 
perceived in India as ‘giving in to the demand for plebiscite in Kashmir’ can thus 
be blocked both by opportunist political parties or determined special interests. A 
‘land for peace deal’ in Kashmir, under these circumstances, is difficult to 
conceptualise, nor is the Israeli experience in this regard particularly encouraging. 
In addition, beleaguered with similar problems with secessionist movements in the 
Northeast, the Indian fear of ‘setting the wrong example’ has to be seen as 
realistic.48 The following statement, made by Mr Brajesh Mishra, one-time 
Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Vajpayee (now National Security Adviser), 
to the G-8 Ambassadors and High Commissioners captures the essence of the 
Indian position on this contentious issue: 
 
The Government of India has repeatedly expressed its view that all 
differences between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu 
and Kashmir, must be settled peacefully through direct negotiations 
between the two countries in accordance with the letter and spirit of 
the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration. However, for the 
dialogue to begin again the Government of Pakistan must take 
credible, firm, substantive and visible action against terrorist groups 
                                                 
46 Cohen (2001), p. 58. 
47 Cohen (2001), p. 62. 
48 For a critique of the Indian position opposing “mediation” on Kashmir, see P.R. Chari, 
“Advantages of Third Party Mediation Are Cited,” India Abroad, July 30, 1999. 
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operating in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India from its soil 
and the territories it controls today. Until that happens the 
Government of India will maintain the heightened vigilance on the 
Line of Control and the International Border as also keep in place the 
other measures, which have been taken in the last few days.49 
 
I n d i a ’ s  f u t u r e  p r o c u r e m e n t  p r o b l e m s  
 
In view of the above, it is difficult to imagine how India can afford to reduce the 
heavy outlay of resources in regional security in the short term, which only adds to 
the overall burden of security. Other, contextual factors make it even harder for 
India to meet these needs financially. Cohen summarises these arguments in terms 
of the following, namely, the cessation of defence credits from the erstwhile Soviet 
Union forcing the Indian military procurements to be done on a ‘cash and carry’ 
basis, the economic restructuring in Russia and CIS leading to persistent demands 
for steep price hikes for defence exports to India, and, the steep fall in the exchange 
value of the rupee, resulting in an equally steep increase in the debt repayment 
obligations for past purchases from both Western and Russian supply sources.50 
The consequences are the erosion and depletion of the already lean defence 
resources, which is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. Hence, India’s 
defence financial planning will continue to be out of sync with the Services’ force 
planning and also because Russian and CIS pressures will persist owing to the 70-
85 per cent dependency on ex-Soviet military equipment. This situation cannot be 
reversed quickly because the effects of, at best, a slower devaluation of the Indian 
currency relative to hard currency will mean restrictions on what and how much a 
shrinking defence rupee can buy from alternative Western sources. India’s defence 
demands are caught in a pincer of rising rouble and dollar value conjoined to, 
dearer internationally available military hardware, spares and services. Therefore, 
almost any reasonable level of funding of defence programmes will be found to be 
inadequate to sustain the existing and planned force structure. 
 
A  t h a w  i n  I n d i a - C h i n a  r e l a t i o n s ?  
 
The easing of tension in India-China relations can help India free up some of the 
resources tied up in the Northeast. From all indications, such efforts are afoot. But 
the legacy of 1962 is hard to live down. In addition, the relative freedom of 
political expression and association in India which results in periodic movements 
in favour of human riots in Tibet, particularly on the occasion of high level visits 
from China set limits to India’s room for manoeuvre. Beijing has supported 
separatist and autonomist groups within India in the past. Stephen Cohen is 
sceptical of any chances of early breakthroughs. “As its own requirements for 
middle Eastern oil draw it into the Indian Ocean, China could also emerge as a 
                                                 
49 GOI, Official Statements (2002), p. 198. Also see “Epilogue: A Restive Relationship 
Enters a New Century,” in Ganguly (2002), pp. 134-143. 
50 Cohen (2001), p. 230. 
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naval rival to India. The realists in Delhi see China continuing its strategy of 
encircling and counterbalancing India, preventing it from achieving its rightful 
dominance of the Subcontinent. This next decade is seen as a transition period, 
when India must cope with expanding Chinese power, achieve a working 
relationship with the Americans, and cautiously use each to balance the other’s 
military, economic, and strategic influence. India’s new balancing act combines 
appeasement of China on the issues of Tibet and Taiwan with the pursuit of 
improved ties with China’s other potential balancers, especially Vietnam and 
Russia.”51 There are shared interests such as the threat of terrorism combined with 
increasingly restive Muslim minorities. Both sides clearly need to search for a 
political formula that will allow for minor adjustments in their respective claims so 
that political honour is served on both sides. 
 
I n d i a  a n d  t h e  ‘ s m a l l ’  S o u t h  A s i a n  n e i g h b o u r s  
 
The so-called ‘small’ neighbours, namely Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, are 
comparable in terms of population to larger European states. The epithet ‘small’ is 
indicative of an approach that is part of India’s problem in the region. In addition, 
there are historic and demographic reasons that contribute to the complexity of the 
problem. Soft borders, illegal immigration, terrorism, smuggling, drugs, water 
resources and the treatment of minorities are among the factors that create 
pressures on India to intervene in what these countries perceive strictly as their 
domestic affairs. Cohen reports two positive developments in this regard. First of 
all, the revolution in economic policy that has swept over India makes it a far more 
attractive country for all of its neighbours and the more developed states of 
Southeast Asia. Indian management expertise, technology, and organisational skills 
are now widely exported to the rest of Asia, giving substance to the Indian claim 
that it is a major power. Secondly, India’s democracy is having a great impact on 
many of its Asian neighbours. For the smaller states of the region, India is 
something of a model of how to peacefully manage a multiethnic, multireligious 
state. 
 
I n d i a ’ s  n u c l e a r  p o l i c y  
 
All available indicators point towards an Indian nuclear program, but “one without 
clear purpose or direction.”52 Indian public opinion supports the bomb, but not for 
warlike purposes. India is engaged in the production of weapons and missiles but, 
unlike other countries similarly engaged, there are no plans for or policies about 
sale or diffusion of such technology. A.P.J. Kalam, one of India’s leading military 
scientists and the ‘father’ of India’s missile programme, has urged India to get into 
the business of missile sales in order to break up the “monopolies” of the dominant 
powers and their unfair regulating mechanisms, such as the Missile Technology 
Control Regime. Kalam’s rejection of the MTCR (Missile Technology Control 
                                                 
51 Cohen (2001), p. 56. 
52 Cohen (2001), chapter 6. 
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Regime) reflects the ambiguous, often contradictory Indian stance on international 
regimes to restrict proliferation of nuclear and missile technology. Accordingly, in 
the course of negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the mid-
1990s, India, which initially had been a committed advocate, turned to its most 
outspoken opponent. Finally, in a move to save both parties face, India accepted 
the provisions of the CTBT and declared a moratorium on nuclear tests in 1999 
without formally signing the treaty. India continues to reject the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) as well as any binding commitment to full-scope safeguards of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As IAEA regularities prohibit 
exports of nuclear technology into states, which do not accept safeguards, India’s 
nuclear energy sector has been cut off from urgently needed know-how and 
hardware. Since India’s nuclear test of 1974, technology imports from the West 
almost ceased, which led to a steady decline in the efficiency of the civilian nuclear 
energy sector. Nuclear energy has never been produced cost-effectively and until 
the mid-1990s, India produced no more than 1500 megawatts of nuclear power, as 
compared to the target of 10.000 megawatts planned in 1985, and less than 2% of 
India’s overall power supply. 53 
 
I n d i a  a n d  t h e  I n d i a n  O c e a n  
 
“India is a maritime nation strategically straddling the Indian Ocean, with a 
substantive sea borne trade. The country’s economic well-being is thus very closely 
linked to our ability to keep our sea-lanes free and open at all times.”54 
Rahul Roy-Chaudhury goes into more detail to drive this point home: 
 
Virtually all of India’s foreign trade, some 97 per cent in volume, is 
transported over the sea; in 1994-95 this accounted for an estimated 
20 per cent of GNP. In addition, as much as 80 per cent of India’s 
demand for oil is met from the sea, either carried aboard ships (46 per 
cent) or extracted from offshore areas (34 per cent).55 
 
Unfortunately, it seems that up to now, India has not actually developed an Indian 
Ocean policy, not even an Indian Ocean economic policy. Despite some efforts of 
some institutions like the Institute for Defence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA) or 
the Society of Indian Ocean Studies (SIOS), both in Delhi, there is no maritime 
strategic doctrine as such in India. According to, for example, Commodore C. 
                                                 
53 Abdul Kalam, then director of the Defense Research Development Organisation, now the 
President of India, quoted in “Boom for Boom,” India Today, April 26, 1999. For a fuller 
study of regional proliferation, regional attitudes, and erstwhile suggestions for averting a 
nuclear arms race, see Stephen P. Cohen, ed., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The 
Prospects for Arms Control (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990). 
54 Mishra (2000), p. 59. 
55 Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul: “India”, in: Bateman, Sam/Bates, Stephen (Hrsg.): Regional 
Maritime Management and Security (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 124). 
Canberra: Australian National University/Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 1998, p. 19-
27 (19). 
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Uday Bhaskar56, there is neither an understanding of India’s maritime history nor 
an Indian Ocean awareness. India is part of the Indian Ocean region, but that is not 
very important for its foreign policy, especially so since all conflicts with 
neighbouring states are situated at India’s land borders. In the perception of most 
Indian specialists on maritime affairs, an Indian Ocean awareness began to develop 
because of the importance of SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication) and the EEZ 
(Exclusive Economic Zones) only very recently. 
Perhaps the most important factor for this neglect is that the current security 
environment in the Indian Ocean is being perceived as a stable and overall positive 
low threat environment. Compared with the superpower conflict in the 1970s and 
1980s, the security situation has improved considerably since the beginning of the 
1990s. Also, there is a consensus among naval officers interviewed that those 
major sea powers which are capable of disrupting the SLOCs are agreed that the 
Indian Ocean should remain peaceful. So, in the opinion of all Indian experts, 
today, there is no power competition visible in this area. Somewhat surprisingly, 
both the United States Navy and the Chinese Navy (People’s Liberation Army 
Navy, PLAN) are not seen as threatening by Indian naval officers, either. In the 
wake of the events of September 11, the USN and the Indian Navy even embarked 
on a bilateral policing of SLOCs in the Arabian Sea.  
In the Indian perception of today, the only possible source of threat to stability 
in the Indian Ocean are non-state actors like pirates (mainly in Bay of Bengal and 
the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea), drug traffickers, gun runners or 
fish poachers. However, India is well aware of the fact that the Indian Navy does 
create some unease, especially among Bay of Bengal rim states like Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh and Myanmar. The reason for this is, in the opinion of the experts, a 
capability mismatch between the Indian Navy and other regional navies. For this 
reason, a process of confidence building has been encouraged by the Indian Navy, 
like invitations for port visits or invitation of delegates from countries with only a 
small navy or no navy at all. Milan in the Bay of Bengal (now Milan East) can be 
mentioned as a successful example of such confidence building measures. In 1999, 
Milan was introduced to the Arabian Sea as Milan West, where naval cooperation 
already exists between the Indian Navy and the navies of Iraq, Iran, Oman and the 
United Arab Emirates. Whether the new Milan West will be as successful as Milan 
East remains to be seen – in the eyes of some Indian naval officers, the success of 
Milan East was due to the happy fact that “the trouble maker [Pakistan] is not 
present there”.57 In the Arabian Sea he is present, and both states’ navies are 
trapped in something akin to a naval Cold War.58 
                                                 
56 Interviewed by Mr. Peter Lehr, M.A. and Ms. Maike Tuchner on August 27, 2000 for the 
research project “Panchayati Raj in the Indian Ocean – Towards a Maritime Security 
Regime?”, funded by the Fritz Thyssen- Foundation, Cologne. 
57 Confidential interview with a high ranking Indian flag officer, August 2000, in Delhi. 
58 Sakhuja, Vijay: “Cold War in the Arabian Sea”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXV, No. 3 
(June 2001), pp. 371-384. Talking about troublemakers: There is still much distrust 
between the Indian Navy and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Although Australian naval 
officers usually claim that they are only fulfilling their duties in regard of the Five Power 
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A m b i v a l e n t  a t t i t u d e s  t o w a r d s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
 
A lot of Indian dilemmas are summed up in terms of the Indian ambivalence 
towards the United States. The Indian public and policy makers alike have 
problems understanding why the United States, itself a secular state and a 
democracy, is not able to support both when it comes to India, as against Pakistan, 
and to a limited extent, against China. The fact that the United States decries 
atrocities against minorities in India but accepts the institutional discrimination 
against minorities in Pakistan raises questions about the real American intentions in 
Asia. But, as part of the war against terrorism, American presence has been 
considerably reinforced in the region, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable 
future.  
India has remained ambivalent with regard to the United States in the recent 
past. Thus, during the Operation Desert Storm against Iraq, the world was first 
treated to pictures of a smiling Indian foreign minister in Baghdad, then the grant 
of refuelling facilities to American aircraft, which were promptly withdrawn when 
the Indian anti-American lobby got wind of it. Americans, who had their fall-back 
arrangements anyway and needed an Indian show of support for propaganda 
purposes, were not amused. On the other hand, the supportive rhetoric of the 
United States in the 1962 India-China war did not translate into actual support on 
the ground and the sending of the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal at the 
height of the India-Pakistan war of 1971 remains a reminder of American 
incomprehension of South Asian realities and insensitivity towards Indian 
sentiments. The increasingly visible and politically active Indian-American lobby 
in the United States and accommodation of American interests in the Indian Ocean 
are two factors that the current government appears to have taken on board with 
regard to the conceptualisation and implementation of Indian policy. 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
Five decades after Independence, the state in India has come to its own. The 
stirring words of Nehru’s “Freedom at Midnight” speech, “… the soul of a nation, 
long suppressed, finds utterance” have found a home in the institutional 
infrastructure of the Indian state. Surreptitiously present, like all strong states, the 
Republic became explicit at moments of crisis, be it Ayodhya, Kargil or Gujarat. 
The strategic doctrine, whose outer contours have been analysed in this article, is 
symbolic of the extension of high stateness to the area of national security. Long a 
reserve of the elite, national security, signifying the power of India’s contentious 
                                                                                                                            
Defence Arrangements (FPDA), Indian naval officers often complain about their ships 
being buzzed and Indian military aircraft being formatted by Australian Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft (MPA). This may or may not be a misperception, but it shows that there is still a 
lot of work ahead of all to improve this sad situation. 
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democracy, has now become an integral part of her national political discourse. 
The result is a strategic doctrine that remains fuzzy but promises to be stable. 
With regard to India’s role in regional and international politics, there are three 
major lobbies in the Indian strategic policy community today. The most visible are 
the advocates of ‘firm India’. Their idea that India should project itself as a firm, 
powerful state and be able to use force freely was the dominant strategic theme in 
Indian policy. The line of thinking, powerfully introduced into Indian politics by 
Indira Gandhi, continues to be actively represented by those who advocate the 
bomb as a symbol of national power.59 This lobby criticises the Simla agreement, 
signed after the 1971 Indo-Pak war, for having been too generous with Pakistan. 
Some strategists, such as the influential K. Subrahmanyam, have taken Indian 
governments to task over the years for yielding to American trade pressures and 
pressures on India’s nuclear program. Subrahmanyam has argued that India needed 
to build up its own defence industry, which would enable it to respond to pressures 
from the United States or China by engaging in its own sale of missiles and 
advanced military technology. This lobby is likely to view the 1988-90 
“peacekeeping” operation in Sri Lanka, which turned into a military catastrophe, as 
a success, because it demonstrated that “India has evolved a ‘will to act’ to 
preserve its vital national interests.”60 The second major voice in India’s strategic 
community are the peace-mongering ‘conciliatory India’ lobby. These leaders and 
specialists “question the strategies of defence-led economic development, a 
boastful military profile, and too quick intervention in the affairs of neighbours. 
They would prefer to deal with Pakistan and China by territorial compromise and 
negotiation, displaying military power only to supplement diplomacy. Those who 
hold this position suggest that the nuclear program be deferred or limited and have 
been marginally more inclined to accept a limited outside role in regional affairs.”61 
While this lobby would not advocate a plebiscite outright, it still pitches its hope in 
a successful solution to the Kashmir imbroglio through effective extension of 
Indian democracy to Kashmir, the holding of free and fair elections and the 
eventual accommodation of Kashmiri nationalism within the framework of the 
Indian state.62 While, not surprisingly, the Indian military privately favours the firm 
India line, there are strong advocates of the conciliatory India even among the top 
brass.” A number of eminent retired senior officers have spoken and written 
                                                 
59 Cohen cites the former Indian diplomat U.S. Bajpai, who concluded: “When our image 
weakened as a result of the 1962 military setback it emboldened Ayub Khan to test whether 
one Pakistani was not equal to ten Indians. Our weak image was responsible for the 
Chinese decision to arm the [rebellious northeast tribal groups such as the] Nagas and 
Mizos and to extend support to a Maoist revolutionary group in West Bengal, the Naxalites. 
Finally, our weak image tempted Yahya Khan to force ten million refugees into our 
territory.” See U.S. Bajpai, India’s Security: The Politico-Strategic Environment (New 
Delhi: Lancers, 1983), pp. 65-66. 
60 Manoi Joshi, “Commitment in Sri Lanka,” The Hindu (International Edition), May 19, 
1990. 
61 Cohen (2001), p. 61. 
62 See Ganguly (2002). 
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publicly in favour of “peace and disarmament” in South Asia.63 Others have written 
scathingly about incompetent management of India’s various wars and conflicts.64 
Finally, there is a third trend whose adherents are the advocates of ‘Didactic India’, 
of India as a civilisational state who see India’s culture as a resource, a part of her 
inherent greatness, a valuable diplomatic asset, and that others must become 
cognisant of the moral quality of Indian foreign and strategic policy. There is much 
public endorsement of this line, the promotion of Indian culture abroad, and the 
extolling of her democracy for the benefit of the international community.65 The 
efforts to tie in the Indian diaspora for the promotion of Indian culture abroad is 
part of this strategy.66 The opening paragraph of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s New 
Year message to the nation, for example, pulls together these sentiments: 
 
To our brave jawans, security forces, and policemen guarding our 
borders and vital installations; to our hard-working kisans who have 
ensured our food security; to our workers and managers who, with 
their sweat and toil, are making India an economic power; to our 
talented software professionals who have burnished India’s image 
abroad; to our children and youth, who are the future of our nation; 
indeed, to every Indian who in his or her own way is contributing to 
nation-building, I wish happiness and prosperity in the New Year. 
I also send my felicitations to all Non-Resident Indians and persons of 
Indian origin, who, despite the distance in space and time that 
separates them from us, have maintained unbreakable social, cultural, 
spiritual and emotional ties with India.67 
 
The Prime Minister’s address represents a superbly crafted blend of all three trends 
depicted above. At a superficial level, one could attribute the three currents 
described above to the three major formations of Indian politics, but that would not 
be right for there are advocates of all three in each major party. It is important here 
                                                 
63 Major General E. D’Souza (retired), “Generals for Peace and Disarmament,” Indian 
Defense Review, July 1989, pp. 116-121. 
64 See L. Chibber, “India-Pakistan Reconciliation: The Impact on International Security,” in 
Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, eds., South Asia after the Cold War: International 
Perspectives (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993). 
65India’s civilisational mission lurks just below the surface of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s 
New Year message to the nation: 
“I am reminded here of the inspiring vision of Maharshi Aurobindo, which he set out in his 
historic radio broadcast for August 15, 1947. ‘I have always held and said that India was 
arising, not to serve her own material interests only, to achieve expansion, greatness, 
power, and prosperity certainly not like others to acquire domination of other peoples, but 
to live also for God and the world as a helper and leader of the whole human race.’” GOI, 
Official Statements (2002), p. 202. 
66There is considerable evidence of a large-scale governmental effort to use the American-
resident Indian community to advance Indian interests. The process was begun in 1970, 
when lobbying efforts of both Indians and sympathetic Americans were coordinated from 
the Embassy in Washington. More recently the Indian government has created a ministry 
for “persons of Indian origin” (PIOs) and “non-resident Indians” (NRIs). 
67 GOI, Official Statements (2002), p. 200. 
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to note that the militant Hindu nationalists took the initiatives to send Prime 
Minister Vajpayee on the bus diplomacy to Lahore, and invited General Musharraf, 
for many, the main architect of the failure of Lahore and the betrayal of Kargil. The 
Congress, long identified with the firm India policy of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv 
Gandhi might have turned of late to a conciliatory tone out of political 
opportunism, but in power, it might come back to where the NDA government 
currently locates itself. As such, even though the current situation with regard to 
the Indian profile is not as cohesive as one might wish it to be, one can safely 
predict its stability despite the current instability of India’s domestic politics. 
As we have already seen in the analysis of the public opinion, the Indian 
electorate itself speaks in many voices. It is therefore quite likely that India will 
continue to look in all three directions at the same time, at least for some time to 
come, and that the Indian doctrine will be anomalous but stable. In anticipation of 
this short term stability, India’s symbol producers are busy giving an institutional 
shape to the new symbols of cultural nationalism, seen in the tone and content of 
cultural diplomacy including festivals of India, attempts by overseas Indian 
populations (especially in America) to influence foreign policy, and attempts to 
directly manipulate foreign public opinion in Western democracies.68 According to 
K. Subrahmanyam, India needs to expand contacts with the American defence 
community and encourage the Indian business community and other resident 
Indians to help make its case. The same approach can be used with India’s 
neighbours, the people of South Asia, who are predisposed to India in any case 
because of a common cultural background. This also comes across in the names 
given to military equipment, such as the Agni missile and the Arjun tank, names 
drawn from Sanskrit or Indian traditions that show the world that Indian science 
and industry can make “sophisticated” systems. Such weapons are projected, both 
for domestic consumption and international propaganda, as symbols of India’s 
‘civilizational accomplishments.’ 
On the basis of his analysis of India as an emerging power, Stephen Cohen 
(2001) came up with four conclusions. These are: India is essentially a status quo 
power (e.g. territorially); the army’s capabilities have greatly increased in the last 
decades; domestic and foreign policy are inseparably linked; and, India holds no 
clear strategic vision for a future among major powers. Though harsh in tone, these 
statements, particularly the fourth of his assertions, is substantially accurate. They 
need careful consideration, for an insecure India can only contribute to the greater 
insecurity of an already fragile region. 
Cohen tempers his overall evaluation of India with an allusion to the path 
dependency of the current Indian predicament. “A generation ago India placed its 
chips on the Soviet Union, economic autarky, and military might. It lost all three 
bets. The past decade has seen a wrenching reappraisal of Indian grand strategy in 
                                                 
68 See Tanham’s core essay, “Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay,” originally a 
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Strategic Thought and Practice, Essays by George K. Tanham with Commentaries (New 
Delhi: Manohar, 1996), pp. 28-111. 
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a changing international environment.”69 A coherent Indian security doctrine will 
need to achieve nothing less than two paradigm-shifts simultaneously, the first, as 
argued in the previous section, to eschew the verbiage and institutional relics of the 
cold war such as the ‘non-aligned movement’ and ‘Afro-Asian solidarity’, and the 
second, to take stock of the burdens of globalisation which entail both the vision 
and will power to accept a necessary shrinking of sovereignty, and the vision to 
engage with situations that do not have any apparent links to national interest. In 
addition, India will need to provide for the imponderables of national, regional and 
international politics such as another vicious communal riot in the same scale as in 
Gujarat with the BJP in the opposition, a revival of Pakistan-Bangladesh-Saudi 
Arabia ties on an anti-India Islamic front, or the impact of the next energy crisis on 
India’s liquidity. How realistic then are India’s prospects of achieving at least the 
uncontested status of a regional power, (comparable to China in East Asia whose 
pre-eminent role is grudgingly accepted by both Taiwan and Japan) and as such, a 
credible bulwark of an international security regime? 
For an answer to the above question, one needs to consider Cohen’s assertion 
that India can be “still a strong state, when necessary”,70 a phenomenon seen in its 
true light in the mass mobilisation in the wake of the Kargil conflict of 1999. 
India’s domestic political stability, governance and rates of net growth of inflation, 
despite short-term fluctuations, continues to be healthy, according to Cohen (2001), 
Sachs et. al. (1999). Observers of the Indian scene explain the resilience of India’s 
security apparatus despite the impression of chaos and uncertainty in terms of the 
continued control of the national government on increasingly powerful regions, and 
to mobilise the full resources of the state for the governance or defence of any 
particular region. The residual legacy of the steel frame of the raj, enhanced 
through the addition of modern technology and accountability, continue to be 
effectively present. Despite occasional outbreaks of police rebellion and 
corruption, the management of security and accommodation of dissidence through 
democratic accommodation and new institutional arrangements continue to be 
effective antidotes to violent or separatist movement.71 This is most evident in the 
northeast, “where yesterday’s student radicals have become today’s members of 
government and have their hands full trying to cope with their revolutionary 
successors.”72 In terms of commitments to the promotion of national power and 
                                                 
69 Cohen (2001), p. 54. 
70 Cohen (2001), p. 113. 
71 For the strategies available for dealing with separatist or insurrectionary movements or 
state-level violence in India, see Ved Marwah, Uncivil Wars: Pathologies of Terrorism in 
India (New Delhi: Indus, 1995). Cohen expresses this method in the words of an actor. “In 
its crudest form, the strategy at both the state and national levels is, in the words of a senior 
IPS officer, to ‘hit them over the head with a hammer, then teach them to play the piano,’ 
which means apply massive (and sometimes brutal) force to contain any group that 
proclaims that it wants to leave the Union, but after that deal with the leadership politically 
in whatever way is necessary.” See Cohen (2001), p. 113. 
72 The Nagas (many of whom were Christians and had strong foreign links to both China 
and Christian missionaries) were eventually beaten down after a ten-year insurrection. 
More recently, separatist Mizos and Bodos, Assamese, Manipuris, and tribal guerrillas in 
Tripura have taken up arms and bombed trains in protest against New Delhi. Since these 
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security while remaining committed to the spatial parameters of the geographic 
status quo, one can be cautiously optimistic about India’s future prospects as a 
regional power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
movements were in a distant corner of India, public and international access could be 
tightly controlled, and since the numbers involved were relatively small, they never 
received much publicity in the human rights community. 
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